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1. Italian companies and access to credit 
Economic growth depends on access to credit, and in Italy this is a particularly sensitive issue 
for various reasons.  
The first is the difficult economic climate, characterized by forecasts for very low GNP 
growth following years of decline and high levels of unemployment especially among young 
people. The second reason is the high level of public debt, which lowers availability of public 
resources and the state’s ability to stimulate the economy. The third reason is the low 
availability of risk capital, revealed by the frequency with which important Italian 
manufacturers have been taken over by overseas companies.  
For all these reasons, in a market like Italy heavily dependent on banks, where public and 
private capital is limited, economic recovery relies on the banking system. Banks are private 
companies and like other firms their objective is profit-making. But they are a particular type 
                                                          
1 This study is the  result of collaboration between Massimo Regalli, Maria-Gaia Soana and Giovanni Verga. 
Section 1 is the work of Massimo Regalli, Sections 2 and 3 of Maria-Gaia Soana and Section 4 of Giovanni 
Verga. 
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of firms and play a key role in society: they affect the business system and thus the system of 
the whole country. Their role and behavior are thus widely studied.  
In recent years the Italian business system has had difficulty in accessing credit  (Visco, 2014; 
ECB, 2014a; ECB, 2014b) and banks have been given the blame for failing to finance debt.  
On their side, however, banks  claim that the financial crisis has been characterized by a big 
fall in demand for credit (Bank of Italy, 2014a) and a sharp deterioration of the two assets 
underpinning lending capacity:  business outlook and associated guarantees. Clearly the 
situation since 2007 has generated uncertainty as far as outlook is concerned; GDP has fallen 
and internal demand is much lower (Visco, 2014). The picture for guarantees, on the other 
hand, is more complex. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision guidelines on 
assessing credit worthiness have altered the role of guarantees in credit disbursement. At the 
same time there has been a sharp deterioration in the values of property traditionally used as 
collateral. It is important to note that as well as this deterioration, there has also been a 
significant loss of appeal of real estate collateral for banks (Bank of Italy, 2014b). 
Credit access is particularly problematic for smaller firms, which are a characteristic of the 
Italian economy in all areas. The European Commission (2014)  notes, “This is one of the 
most problematic areas for the Italian SME sector. … Banks are less willing to provide loans 
to SMEs, and this, together with higher rejection and unacceptable loan rates, signals a 
drying up of private-sector financial support, compounded by diminished access to public 
sector financial support, either national or European.” 
 
Assessments of the debt level of Italian firms also have an impact. Panetta (2014) for example 
notes “Italian firms’ leverage is also relatively high by international standards. According to 
the financial accounts, in 2012 it exceeded the euro-area average and the figure for Germany 
by 6 percentage points and was 14 points higher than in France. Comparable gaps existed in 
the years before the crisis”.  
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And the Governor of the Banca d’Italia (2014) writes, “Italian firms’ indebtedness and 
dependence on bank credit are signs of their financial vulnerability. With almost €1.3 trillion 
in financial debt and €1.6 trillion in net equity, Italian firms’ overall leverage is 44 per cent; 
bank loans account for 64 per cent of the total debt. For the euro area these ratios are 
considerably lower, averaging 39 and 46 per cent respectively.”  
In this context, this paper discusses demand and supply of credit to Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SME) during the financial crisis in Italy (2007-2012). The aim is to establish 
whether the shortfall and rationing of bank loans made to SMEs is due to a fall in demand or 
in supply. 
Various studies have been made on the European market in this field. Specifically, Puri et al., 
(2009) identify a substantial supply effect on bank credit to retail customers in Germany in 
the period 2006-2008. On the other hand, Rottmann and Wollmershauser (2010) state that 
“most surprisingly, in the current financial crisis, in which banks are more involved than in 
the previous recessions due to massive write-downs of toxic assets, the indications of a credit 
crunch are rather weak” in Germany. Moreover, Jimenéz et al. (2012) find that “weakness in 
bank balance sheets reduces the supply of bank credit in Spain in crisis times (credit 
crunch)”. On the Portuguese market, Iyer et al. (2010) find that the interbank liquidity shock 
led to credit supply contraction in the period 2007-2009 primarily for entrepreneurial firms, 
which “cannot compensate the reduction in loan supply via obtaining credit from other, less 
affected, banks, or from other sources of credit”. These findings are confirmed by Popov and 
Udell (2011). Their analysis, carried out on 16 emerging European markets, demonstrates that 
“SMEs report higher credit constraints in localities dominated by branches or subsidiaries of 
banks, which have low equity capital and low Tier 1 capital ratios, and which have recorded 
losses on financial assets”. Reductions in credit lending during the crisis affected also the 
French market. On this point, Kremp and Sevestre (2012) state that “even during the financial 
crisis, credit rationing remained quite limited for French SMEs. Even though banks 
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decreased their loan supply by adopting more restrictive lending standards, especially 
regarding weaker firms, firms’ demand for new loans decreased even more strongly due to 
the deterioration of the economic environment”. 
Lastly, Italian SMEs too have suffered financial constraints during the crisis. On this point, 
Presbitero et al. (2012) show that “in the post-Lehman period (from October 2008 to 
September 2009, Author’s note) Italian firms had a 7.8% higher probability of being credit 
rationed. Moreover, the credit crunch has been more severe in provinces with larger shares 
of branches owned by distantly managed banks”. This is confirmed by Albertazzi and 
Marchetti (2010), who show that “the dampening effect on credit supply of less-capitalized 
banks has been quite sizeable” in Italy in the period September 2008-March 2009. By 
analyzing the impact of the credit supply restrictions across firm types, Albertazzi and 
Marchetti (2010) also find that “larger less-capitalized banks have reallocated their credit 
away from riskier firms. Quite strikingly, this fight to quality has not been observed for 
smaller less-capitalized banks”. Artola and Genre (2011) on the other hand, in a Europe-wide 
study for the period 2009-2010  note that “surprisingly enough, in Italy, the predicted 
probability of being financially constrained turns out to be significantly lower for small and 
medium firms than for large companies.” 
The present paper is based in this context. Specifically, it investigates the existence of credit 
rationing in the Italian corporate bank loan market by estimating a demand-supply 
disequilibrium model for bank credit in the period 2007-2012. From this model, we derive the 
proportion of credit rationed companies using a panel data set of private Italian SMEs.  
 
2. Sample and methodology 
Following previous literature (Ogawa and Suzuki, 2000; Atanasova and Wilson, 2004), we 
use a panel data set to estimate the disequilibrium model of Italian SME corporate bank 
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lending. Our database consists of 35,541 Italian unlisted SMEs2 in the period 2007-2012. We 
exclude from the sample financial and public service companies and eliminate those firm-year 
observations reporting negative sales, total assets, interest rates, liquidity indexes and equity 
capital. Data are obtained from the Bureau Van Dijk AIDA database (Analisi Informatizzata 
delle Aziende. The final sample consists of 121,425 observations, as shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Distribution of observations over years  
 
Year 
Number 
of firms 
Number of firms - 
percentage 
Number of firms 
(cumulative) 
Number of firms - 
percentage (cumulative) 
2007 20,385 16.79 20,385 16.79 
2008 21,888 18.03 42,273 34.81 
2009 23,804 19.60 66,077 54.42 
2010 24,890 20.50 90,967 74.92 
2011 26,206 21.58 117,173 96.50 
2012 4,252 3.50 121,425 100.00 
Total 121,425 100.00 121,425 100.00 
 
Table 1 shows the number of observations of 35,541 non-listed Italian companies in the 
period 2007-2012. Source -AIDA. 
 
 
Looking at the distribution of observations across the industries (Table 2) "Wholesale", 
"Construction" and “Wood and paper paste” industry contribute most with almost 43% of total 
observations.  
The sample is in general representative of the Italian economy as a whole. Table 3 reports some 
descriptive statistics for the variables used, while Table 4 shows the correlations between the 
independent variables. The results appear to support the theory that every independent variable 
has its own informative value in explaining the dependent variable. 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 According to EU guideliness, the main characteristics of an SME are: (i) fewer than 250 employees and (ii) 
annual turnover not exceeding 50 million euro, and/or the annual balance sheet total not  exceeding 43 million 
euro. We therefore eliminated from the initial sample those firms whose turnover was below 2 million euros (EU 
definition - micro firms) and over 50 million euros (EU definition - large firms). 
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Table 2 
Distribution of observations over industry 
 
Sector 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Agriculture 411 427 437 457 486 100 
Mining 116 109 115 120 117 19 
Manufacturing 969 1,026 1,128 1,204 1,261 187 
Textiles and clothes 1,176 1,233 1,272 1,319 1,345 211 
Wood and paper paste 2,184 2,284 2,475 2,495 2,629 446 
Metallurgy 1,803 1,913 2,079 2,145 2,242 335 
Electronics 1,905 2,024 2,202 2,265 2,348 383 
Automotive 287 302 325 352 349 57 
Furniture 393 410 415 436 425 55 
Other manufacturing 340 360 377 382 400 49 
Energy 456 511 582 630 707 107 
Construction 2,553 2,751 2,996 3,187 3,380 530 
Wholesale 4,073 4,406 4,822 4,949 5,175 840 
Retail commerce 684 767 850 926 992 185 
Transport 876 943 1054 1,112 1,164 200 
Service 235 255 278 286 313 39 
Communication 164 181 197 202 211 38 
Informatics 220 265 303 334 386 59 
Advisory 606 692 768 865 913 211 
Tourism 410 450 511 554 621 95 
Education 26 32 36 39 42 12 
Health 351 373 386 418 465 66 
Entertainment 76 87 100 104 120 19 
Other services 69 85 94 107 114 9 
Total 20,385 21,888 23,804 24,890 26,206 4,252 
 
Table 2 shows the number of observations of 35,541 non-listed Italian companies in the period 
2007-2012 over different industries. Source - AIDA Database). 
 
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics (I frattili al 5% non li metti?) 
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
Sizet 16.25 16.19 0.94 0.38 4.69 
Sizet-1 16.23 16.15 0.97 0.56 5.33 
ST_Fint -6.00 0.00 526.53 -255.00 75,201 
LT_Fint 5.20 -0.01 524.99 17.87 16,030 
Casht 4.21 3.41 6.87 -5.57 228.00 
Sub_ft 2.80 0.00 7.49 4.50 29.34 
Sub_ct 25.64 22.84 16.71 0.94 4.03 
Intt-1 5.68 5.15 3.98 0.94 4.08 
Z_scoret-1 1.56 1.44 0.91 2.05 15.31 
Collt 0.22 0.16 0.21 1.10 3.70 
∆Salest -2.73 0.00 59.92 -2.17 53.54 
Ownt 2.93 4.00 1.19 -0.39 1.46 
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics of the sample. The sample consists of 
121,425 observations of 35,541 non-listed Italian companies between 2007 
and 2012.  
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Table 4 
Correlation matrix 
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Sizet 1.000 0.922 0.024 -0.010 -0.020 0.028 -0.350 -0.058 -0.432 0.202 -0.045 0.061 
Sizet-1 0.922 1.000 -0.041 -0.010 -0.045 0.027 -0.347 -0.057 -0.447 0.179 -0.236 0.064 
ST_Fint 0.024 -0.041 1.000 0.000 0.012 0.002 -0.000 0.004 0.009 0.003 0.059 -0.002 
LT_Fint -0.010 -0.010 0.000 1.000 -0.001 0.003 0.003 -0.002 0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.002 
Casht -0.020 -0.045 0.012 -0.001 1.000 -0.069 -0.040 -0.049 0.189 0.060 0.094 0.020 
Sub_ft 0.028 0.027 0.002 0.003 -0.069 1.000 -0.127 0.037 -0.101 0.062 -0.013 -0.025 
Sub_ct -0.350 -0.347 -0.000 0.003 -0.040 -0.127 1.000 0.049 0.364 -0.347 0.111 -0.018 
Intt-1 -0.058 -0.057 0.004 -0.002 -0.049 0.037 0.049 1.000 0.015 -0.010 -0.026 -0.005 
Z_scoret-1 -0.432 -0.447 0.009 0.000 0.189 -0.101 0.364 0.015 1.000 -0.319 -0.067 -0.011 
Collt 0.202 0.179 0.003 -0.000 0.060 0.062 -0.347 -0.010 -0.319 1.000 -0.000 -0.045 
∆Salest -0.045 -0.236 0.059 0.001 0.094 -0.013 0.111 -0.026 -0.067 -0.000 1.000 -0.010 
Ownt 0.061 0.064 -0.002 -0.002 0.020 -0.025 -0.018 -0.005 -0.011 -0.045 -0.010 1.000 
Table 4 shows the correlation matrix of the independent variables. The sample consists of 121,425 
observations of 35,541 non-listed Italian companies between 2007 and 2012. 
 
 
As suggested by Ogawa and Suzuki (2000), Atanasova and Wilson (2004), Carbo-Valverde et 
al. (2009), and Kremp and Sevestre (2012), we empirically investigate the existence of credit 
rationing in the Italian corporate bank loan market by estimating a demand-supply 
disequilibrium model for bank credit. In order to test  the existence of a disequilibrium in the 
credit market (i.e. credit rationing), we calculate the following simultaneous equation model 
(Laffont and Garcia, 1977; Kremp and Sevestre, 2012): (i) a demand equation Lt
d; (ii) a 
supply equation Lt
s; (iii) and a transaction equation Lt. 
 Lt
d = β1x1t + ε1t (1) 
 Lt
s = β2x2t + ε2t (2) 
 Lt = min (Lt
d, Lt
s) (3) 
where x1t and x2t are exogenous and independent vectors, β1 and β2 are their coefficients and ε1t 
and ε2t are disturbance terms. In our model only the amount of bank credit received (Lt) is 
observed, while Lt
d and Lt
s are the results of estimations. Equation (3) links the observed amount 
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of bank loans received by firms to the unobserved demand and supply. Specifically, our model 
assumes that the observed amount of bank credit is the minimum of supply and demand. In 
estimating SME demand and supply of credit in Italy we use the same log-likelihood method 
(LLM) used by Kremp and Sevestre (2012), although our specification is somewhat simpler 
because we do not consider firms with zero-bank loans. Since LLM estimators may present 
convergence problems, we supply the EViews 7 routine with realistic starting values derived 
from a non-linear LS estimator. The condition for discriminating between demand and supply 
of credit is estimated by the system (1)-(2)-(3). It can be easily simplified as: 
  Lt = Lt
d [Lt
d  Lt
s] + Lt
s [Lt
d > Lt
s] (4) 
or 
 Lt = Lt
d +( Lt
s - Lt
d)[Lt
d > Lt
s], (5) 
where the logical symbol [xRy] corresponds to 1 if xRy is true, and to 0 otherwise. Equation  
(5) can thus be expressed as: 
 Lt = (β1x1t + ε1t ) + (β2x2t + ε2t - β1x1t - ε1t ) [β1x1t - β2x2t > ε2t - ε2t ] (6) 
Lt = β1x1t   + (β2x2t - β1x1t  ) [β1x1t - β2x2t > ε2t - ε2t ]+ ε1t + (ε2t - ε1t ) [β1x1t - β2x2t > ε2t - ε2t ]      (7) 
that can be estimated in the approximated form: 
 Lt = β1x1t   + (β2x2t - β1x1t  ) [β1x1t - β2x2t ]+ residuals (8) 
in order to obtain starting coefficients, even if these are biased, to use as starting values for the 
EViews maximum likelihood iterations. Moreover, we define: 
 d = Lt - β1x1t  if  Lt  is a demand (9) 
 s = Lt - β2x1t   if  Lt  is a supply (10) 
 d = (d) and s = (s) , (11) 
  = correlation between d and s (12) 
 (.) = the normal N(0,1) density function (13) 
 (.) = the cumulative normal N(0,1) density function (14) 
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The components of d independent from s (corresponding to the residuals of the regression of 
d on s) are given by: 
 d' = d –(d /s)s. (15) 
Similarly,  
 s' = s–(s/d) (16) 
are the components of s independent from d. The standard deviations of d' and s' are 
 d' = d (1-2)1/2 (17) 
and  
 s' = s(1-2)1/2 (18) 
respectively. The basic idea is that the probability that the actual Lt is ?????a supply is higher 
the lower d'. If Lt is much lower than its corresponding estimated demand, the possibility of a 
rationing is high. In terms of probability,  
 Prob(Lt is a supply) = [1 – (d'/d' )]. (19) 
On the other hand, the lower the actual loans compared to their estimated supply, the more 
likely that the demand is low and there is no rationing (that is, Lt is a demand):  
 Prob(Lt is a demand) = [1 – (s'/s' )]. (20) 
The contribution to the likelihood of an observation t is therefore: 
 [(d'/d')/d'] [1 – (s'/s' )] + [(s'/s')/s'] [1 – (d'/d' )]. (21) 
The demand equation Lt
d (1) we estimated is the following: 
 
Lt
d = α + β1Sizet-1 + β2ST_Fint + β3 LT_Fint + β4Casht + β5Sub_ft + β6Sub_ct + β7Intt-1  
+ β8Yeart + ε (22) 
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where ‘Size’ is the firm size calculated as the natural logarithm of firm's total assets, ‘ST_Fin’ 
is the short-term financing need estimated through the increase in working capital3 over total 
assets, ‘LT_Fin’ is the long-term financing need proxied by the amount of firm investment over 
total assets, ‘Cash’ is the internal available resources calculated as the company cash flow over 
total assets, ‘Sub_f’ is the financial substitute for bank finance estimated as the firm non-bank 
financial debt over total assets, ‘Sub_c’ is the commercial substitute for bank finance proxied 
by the firm commercial debt over total assets, ‘Int’ is the cost of bank debt calculated as the 
ratio of firm interest expenses over total debt and ‘Year’ is the year dummies. 
We expect that firm size, internal available resources, substitutes for bank finance and cost of 
bank debt are inversely related to credit demand. On the contrary, we assume that firms with 
more financing needs show a higher demand for bank credit. 
The supply equation Lt
s (2) we estimated is the following: 
 
Lt
s = α + γ1Sizet + γ2Z_scoret-1 + γ3Collt + γ4∆Salest + γ5Ownt + γ6Yeart + ε                (23) 
 
where ‘Size’ is the firm size calculated as the natural logarithm of firm's total assets, ‘z_score’ 
is the firm default risk estimated by the Altman Z-score calculated for private companies, ‘Coll’ 
is the ability to provide collateral proxied by tangible assets over total assets, ‘∆Sales’ is the 
change in sales measured by the change of natural logarithm of sales between t and t-1, ‘Own’ 
is the ownership concentration and ‘Year’ is the year dummies. 
Following Albertazzi and Marchetti (2010), we proxy the firm default risk by the Altman Z-
score estimated for private companies (Altman, 1968, 1977). This measure predicts the 
probability that a firm will go into bankruptcy within two years and is proven to be suitable for 
Italian companies (Altman et al., 2013). The Z-score estimated for private companies is a linear 
                                                          
3 Working capital is calculated as the sum of trade credit and inventories, net of commercial debt. 
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combination of five business ratios, weighted by coefficients, according to the following 
formula: 
 Z = 0.717x1 + 0.847x2 + 3.107x3 + 0.420x4 + 0.998x5 (24) 
where x1 = (current assets - current liabilities) / total assets; x2 = retained earnings / total assets; 
x3 = earnings before interest and taxes / total assets; x4 = book value of equity / total liabilities; 
x5 = sales/ total assets.  
Moreover, we measure ownership concentration by BVD Independence Ratio. This ratio, 
available from the AIDA database, classifies firms into four groups: (i) no shareholder holding 
more than 25% of equity capital (independent companies); (ii) one or more shareholder holding 
more than 25% of equity capital, but not over 50%; (iii) more than one shareholder holding 
together more than 50% of equity capital (indirectly majority owned companies); (iv) at least 
one shareholder holding more than 50% of equity capital (directly majority owned companies). 
We proxy ownership concentration by a scale from 1 (independent companies) to 4 (directly 
majority owned companies). 
We expect firms with smaller size and bigger decrease in sales to be more financially 
constrained. But we assume that banks prefer to offer credit to firms characterized by low 
default risk degree, high ability to provide collateral and lower concentrated ownership.  
We measure credit rationing according to two different models. The first model (Kremp and 
Sevestre, 2012) consists of computing the unconditional probability of a partial credit rationing 
as follows: 
 
Pr (Partial rationing) = Pr (Xdbd + ud > Xsbs + us) = Pr (Xdbd − Xsbs > us − ud) =  
= Pr (((Xdbd − Xsbs) / σ) > ((us – ud) / σ)) = Φ((Xdbd – Xsbs) / σ) (25) 
 
where Xd and Xs represent respectively the explanatory factors of the demand for loans and 
supply of loans, bd and bs their coefficients, ud and us the unobserved factors that may 
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respectively affect the demand and supply of loans, which may be correlated with each other, 
and σ2 = var(us − ud). 
Finally, the second model estimates the conditional probability, i.e. the probability of partial 
rationing, conditional on the observed amount of loans (Gersovitz, 1980, Kremp and Sevestre, 
2012). Conditional probability, which differs from unconditional probability when the 
variances of the disturbances of the supply and demand equations significantly differ from each 
other, is calculated as follows: 
 
       (26)   
 
where: 
- NLt are new loans at time t; 
- fd (NLt) = (1/σd 2π ) exp ((-1/2σ2d (NLt – Xd,tbd)2) is the density function of loans if 
demand is observed; 
- Fd = ɸ (((NLt – Xd,tbd) – ρ (σd / σs)(NLt – Xs,tbs))/( σ2d 
2ρ1 )) is the corresponding 
cumulative function, accounting for a possible correlation with the supply equation; 
- fs (NLt) = (1/σs 2π ) exp ((-1/2σ2s (NLt – Xs,tbs)2) is the density function of loans if supply 
is observed; 
- Fs = ɸ (((NLt – Xs,tbs) – ρ (σs / σd)(NLt – Xd,tbd))/( σ2s 
2ρ1 )) is the corresponding 
cumulative function. 
 
We compute this probability and consider that a firm is credit rationed when this probability is 
greater than 0.5. 
 
 
))(NLF)(1(NLf))(NLF)(1(NLf
))(NLF)(1(NLf
)NLrationing/ (PartialPr 
tdtststd
tdts
t



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3. Results 
Results of the disequilibrium model for corporate bank lending 2007-2012are reported in Table 
5. The residual distribution is assumed to be a Student's t with three degrees of freedom4 and 
we suppose that standard deviations of both demand (σd) and supply (σs) residuals are the same.  
 
Table 5 
Demand and supply of credit 
 
 Variables Coefficient Std. Error Probability 
Ltd 
 const 2.073*** 0.148 0.000 
 Year 2009 -0.410*** 0.019 0.000 
 Year 2010 -0.489*** 0.019 0.000 
 Sizet-1 -0.053*** 0.008 0.000 
 ST_Fint 0.674*** 0.026 0.000 
 LT_Fint -0.002* 0.001 0.077 
 Casht -4.143*** 0.125 0.000 
 Sub_ft -1.377*** 0.093 0.000 
 Sub_ct -0.073 0.049 0.135 
 Intt-1 -0.234*** 0.001 0.000 
Lts 
 const -1.975*** 0.541 0.0003 
 Year 2008 -0.107 0.097 0.2683 
 Year 2010 0.109 0.119 0.3612 
 Sizet 0.132*** 0.031 0.0000 
 Z_scoret-1 0.773*** 0.057 0.0000 
 Collt 1.630*** 0.216 0.0000 
 ∆Salest 0.868*** 0.025 0.0000 
 Own t -0.264*** 0.023 0.0000 
  Log likelihood -73242.77   
  Avg. log likelihood -0.671   
  N. of observations 121,425   
  Number of Coefs. 20   
 
Table 5 reports the disequilibrium model for the period 2007-2012 applied to Equations (1), (2) and 
(3), where the dependent variable is the change in natural logarithm of total amount of bank loans 
between t and t-1. The estimation was performed by means of the LLM (log-likelihood method) 
statistical package E-views 7. The sample consists of 121,425 observations of 35,541 non-listed 
Italian companies between 2007 and 2012. 
 
 
As regards the demand equation, all economic independent variables are significant at 1% level 
except for long-term financing needs and commercial substitutes for bank finance. More 
specifically, the dependent variable is inversely related to firm size, long-term financing needs, 
internal available resources, financial substitute for bank finance and cost of bank debt. This 
                                                          
4 This distribution best shows the ?residual kurtosis ? kurtosis of residuals. 
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has three implications. First, small firms requested more bank credit than large ones, as 
suggested by previous literature (Atanasova and Wilson, 2004; Carbo-Valverde et al., 2009; 
Iyer et al., 2013). Second, the demand for short-term loans increases if long-term financing 
needs decrease and if a firm has fewer internal available sources (Atanasova and Wilson, 2004; 
Carbo-Valverde et al., 2009; Iyer et al., 2013). Third, SMEs with more available substitutes for 
bank finance (i.e. non-bank financial debts and commercial debts) and higher cost of bank credit 
show a lower demand for loans.  
Moreover, the dependent variable is directly related to short-term financing needs: this suggests 
that companies registering bigger increases in working capital in the year t compared to year t-
1 exhibit the most demand for short-term credit. 
Examining the time dummies, the results show that the demand for bank credit was lower in 
2009 and 2010, dummies for other years (2007, 2008 and 2011) being not significant.  (For this 
reason they are not shown in Table 5). 
As regards the supply equation, the results are consistent with our expectations, as all 
explanatory economic variables are found significant at 1% level.  
Firm size, the Altman Z-score, ability to provide collateral and change in sales show a 
significant positive effect on the amount of bank credit supplied to the company. This means 
that banks prefer to offer credit to larger firms (as suggested by Carbo-Valverde et al., 2009) 
and to companies characterized by low default risk degree, and confirms the "flight to quality 
effect" found by Albertazzi and Domenico (2010). Moreover, the amount of tangible assets 
available to offer as collateral appears to exert a positive effect on the possibility of obtaining 
loans from banks because the ability to provide collateral is considered a risk mitigant by 
banks, as in previous literature (Carbo-Valverde et al., 2009; Kremp and Sevestre, 2012). 
Furthermore, our results show that firms with bigger decreases in sales are more financially 
constrained. Finally, ownership structure is negatively related with the dependent variable: 
this means that banks consider a strong ownership concentration a negative element in 
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lending decisions. This result can be explained by the fact that private companies with 
concentrated ownership show a high cost of capital and are often characterized by the 
presence of a large shareholder trying to deprive small owners of their part of residual 
income. On the other hand, in firms with widespread ownership, shareholders exert control 
over one another and, moreover, each individual can offer personal collateral to banks.  
By means of our disequilibrium model, we calculate the amount of bank credit requested by 
Italian SMEs and supplied by banks. We estimate credit rationing by using the two models 
described in (25) and (26). Table 6 shows the percentage of rationed firms in the period 2007-
2012. 
 
Table 6 
Credit rationing in the period 2007-2012 
 
SMEs credit rationed (%) 
Model 1 
SMEs credit rationed  
Model 2 
2007 36.5% 31.3% 
2008 35.6% 32.4% 
2009 28.0% 26.4% 
2010 25.7% 24.9% 
2011 35.6% 35.2% 
2012 39.1% 39.0% 
 
Table 6 reports credit rationing estimated according to Model 1 
(Equation (25)) and Model 2 (Equation (26)). The sample consists of 
121,425 observations of 35,541 non-listed Italian companies between 
2007 and 2012. 
 
 
As predicted, our results suggest that Italian SMEs have been credit rationed during the crisis, 
especially in the years 2007, 2008, 2011 and 2012. During the crisis, reduction in lending was 
caused by both demand-side and supply-side factors. More specifically, in the period 2009-
2010, demand was very low, but in the years 2007, 2008, 2011 and 2012, the supply effect was 
crucial. Specifically, our results show that credit rationing increased in 2012, especially for 
riskier firms, i.e. companies characterized by low profitability (measured by ROE and ROI) and 
high default risk (measured by Altman’s Z-score), as reported in Figure 1. 
 
17 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Credit rationing, profitability and default risk in 2012 
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On the demand side, we find that SMEs demanding more bank credit during 2012 are those 
companies characterized by small size, high investments, low profitability, low cost of debt 
capital and a decrease in cash flow and sales, as shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 
Determinants of credit demand by Italian SMEs in 2012 
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the variable “rationing” as described in Equation (25), we apply a probit estimation (Table 7). 
This estimation shows that the lagged dependent variable ("rationing" in t-1) is positive and 
strongly significant.  
 
Table 7 
Probit analysis applied to individual firm rationing 
 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
constant -1.601 0.048 -32.91 0.0000 
% Rationed firms year t-1 0.022 0.011 -85.99 0.0000 
 % Rationed firms (%) year t 0.036 0.001 32.08 0.0000 
Rationing t-1 of firm i 1.232 0.002 14.02 0.0000 
McFadden R-squared 0.154 Obs with Dep=0 55,575 
Obs with Dep=1 25,160 Total obs 80,735 
 
Table 7 reports the probit model for the period 2007-2012. The estimation was performed 
by means of the ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing). The covariance matrix is 
computed using second derivatives. The variable “rationing” is calculated following 
Equation (25).  
 
 
The behaviour of the variables from the two different sources does not appear to conflict, thus 
confirming our results. 
 
4. Conclusions 
On the basis of a large panel data set of private Italian SMEs, our paper estimates a 
disequilibrium model of demand and supply of credit in the period 2007-2012. This model 
allows us to separate financially constrained and unconstrained firms on the basis of demand 
factors. 
The results of our study show that, over the period 2007-2012, private Italian SMEs were credit 
rationed, especially in the years 2007, 2008, 2011 and 2012. This evidence is consistent with 
surveys conducted by the Bank of Italy and the European Central Bank. 
On the demand side, firms which requested more bank credit are smaller companies showing 
higher short term financing needs, fewer internal available sources and fewer substitutes for 
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bank finance. On the other hand, higher interest rates applied by financial companies lowered 
the requirement for bank credit. 
On the supply side, banks reduced lending more to smaller firms which presented a high degree 
of default risk. Banks preferred to allocate new credit to Italian SMEs which could offer 
collateral and showed bigger increases in sales. Our results also show that banks consider a 
strong ownership concentration a negative element in deciding for lending. Private firms where 
the ownership is concentrated in fact show a high cost of capital and are often characterized by 
the presence of a large shareholder trying to deprive small shareholders of their part of residual 
income. On the other hand, in firms with widespread ownership, shareholders exert control over 
one another and, moreover, each individual can offer personal collateral to banks. 
Our results suggest that, during the crisis, reduction in lending was caused by both demand-side 
and supply-side factors. Another important result of our estimations is that individual rationing 
is a persistent phenomenon.  
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